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THE CASE OF THE
BLACK-GLOVED RAPIST:
Defining the Public Defender's Role
in the California Courts, 1913-1948
SARA MAYEUX*
F or seven months, an assailant that the San Francisco newspapers hadnicknamed the "Black-Gloved Rapist" terrorized the city, breaking
into his victims' homes at midnight wearing black gloves and carrying a
pencil flashlight. Finally, the police nabbed their man. Frank Avilez was
arrested on Saturday morning, July 12, 1947, "and for many hours ques-
tioned by police inspectors and assistant district attorneys" until he con-
fessed to everything: fourteen rapes and attempted rapes.' Avilez was 24
years old - with a 17-year-old wife - but had, according to his psychiatric
records, the "mental age" of a 10-year-old, an IQ in the 70s, and a possible
* [Editor's note: Sara Mayeux is a JD Candidate at Stanford Law School and a PhD
Candidate in American history at Stanford University. This article was the winning
entry in the California Supreme Court Historical Society's 2010 Student Writing Com-
petition.]
I am grateful for the helpful suggestions I have received on this paper and related re-
search from professors Barbara Babcock, Bob Gordon, Amalia Kessler, Norm Spaulding,
and Bob Weisberg. Thanks also to my classmates in the 2009 Legal History Workshop
and the 2008-09 Legal Studies Workshop at Stanford Law School, and the San Francisco
public defenders who inspired my interest in the topic when I was an intern in 2008.
1 People v. Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d 289, 292 (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 1948); Rapist Con-
fesses, S. F. CHRONICLE, July 13, 1947, at 1.
CALIFORNIA LEGAL HISTORY * VOLUME 5, 2010
diagnosis of "sexual psychopathy."2 "My married life was all right," he told
the San Francisco Chronicle, when asked about his motive. "I just didn't
like staying home nights."3
After his bail hearing on Monday morning, July 14, Avilez's family
sought the help of Melvin Belli, a young trial lawyer who would soon win
national fame and fortune as the flamboyant "King of Torts."4 Belli agreed
to take the case, and contacted the district attorney's office to announce
that he had been retained to represent Avilez. He also mentioned that the
defendant's family was planning to attend the next day's arraignment, and
asked that the case be held over until the family arrived.
The next morning in court, there was some confusion in the court-
room as to who was representing Avilez. The D.A. told the judge about
his conversation with Belli, but no one told the defendant or the public
defender about it. According to a police inspector, Avilez was unhappy be-
cause Belli had visited him in jail the night before and proposed an insan-
ity plea; he said that "he was sane and guilty and wanted to get this over
as soon as possible."5 Meanwhile, not knowing the family had retained
Belli, Avilez's wife had visited the public defender's office at some point to
discuss the case.6
In light of all this, and since he was never told that Belli and Avilez's
family were on the way, Gerald Kenny, the public defender, assumed
Avilez to be his client. Kenny looked over the complaint, then went over to
the cage and spent "a matter of seconds" conversing with Avilez through
2 Appellant's Opening Brief at 12-13, People v. Avilez, 1 Crim. 2506 (Cal.App. 1st
Dist. 1948). Avilez's older brother had been committed to the Sonoma State Home for
the Feeble-Minded since 1936. Id. All court documents related to Avilez cited in this
essay are available at the California State Archives by requesting the file for California
case number 1 Crim. 2506.
3 Confessed Rapist in Jail, S. F. CHRONICLE, July 14, 1947, at 3.
4 Belli was dubbed the "King of Torts" by Time magazine in 1954. In addition
to being credited with pioneering modern products liability law, he grabbed head-
lines with his glamorous clientele, which included Mae West, Errol Flynn, the Rolling
Stones, Jack Ruby, and Zsa Zsa Gabor. See Jim Herron Zamora, "'King of Torts' Belli
dead at 88," S.F. EXAMINER, July 10, 1996. A somewhat fawning biography of Belli is
Mark Shaw, MELVIN BELLI: KING OF THE COURTROOM (1976).
5 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 292.
6 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 19.
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the bars.7 "There are 32 charges against you," he began. Avilez responded,
"I know; I have admitted them all; I want to plead guilty."8 As Kenny saw it,
once Avilez said those words, "there was nothing else I could do. I am not
supposed to obstruct justice."9 According to Avilez, Kenny told him "not
to worry about nothing," just "to say whatever he told me" and "he would
fix everything up."10
Shortly thereafter Avilez's case was called and the municipal court judge
asked him to confirm that he wanted to be represented by the public de-
fender. "Yes," Avilez responded. The public defender added, "He stated he
has no funds. His wife visited the office and she has no funds to employ
private counsel."" Satisfied with this brief colloquy, the judge appointed the
public defender and accepted Avilez's guilty pleas to seven counts of rape,
four counts of attempted rape, one assault, and ten counts each of burglary
and robbery.12 By the time Belli arrived in court, the hearing was over and
Avilez had been bound over to the superior court for sentencing. As Kenny
was leaving the courtroom, he ran into Belli in the courthouse hallway. That
was the first he heard that Avilez's family had retained Belli's firm.13
Belli moved to withdraw Avilez's plea, but the superior court judge de-
nied the motion and sentenced Avilez to 440 years in prison.14 On appeal,
the First District overturned the convictions on the grounds that Avilez
had been denied "a fair opportunity to secure the aid of counsel" and that
"the aid of counsel furnished was not effective and substantial."15 The ap-
pellate court's central complaint about the proceedings below was that the
judge and prosecutor had allowed Avilez to proceed with his guilty plea
though knowing that his family, with private defense counsel, was on the
7 Id. at 16 (quoting testimony of Frank Avilez).
8 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 292-93.
9 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18 (quoting testimony of Gerald
Kenny).
10 Id. at 16 (quoting testimony of Frank Avilez).
11 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 293.
12 Gets 440 Years for Rape, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1947, at 18.
13 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 19.
14 Gets 440 Years for Rape, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1947, at 18. According to press re-
ports, when he heard the sentence Avilez "made a wild attempt to escape," kicking and
flailing until six police officers "finally got [him] down and were able to hold him." Id.
15 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 295.
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way. However, the appellate court also rejected the public defender's con-
tention "that when [Avilez] declared to him that he wanted to plead guilty
there was nothing else for him to do without obstructing justice."16
By the time of Avilez's hearing, public defenders would have been fa-
miliar figures in San Francisco courtrooms. San Francisco established its
public defender's office in 1921; it was one of several California jurisdic-
tions to establish such an office in the Progressive Era, beginning with Los
Angeles in 1913, in an effort to replace corrupt "shyster lawyers" with well-
funded public servants, while also ensuring that indigent defendants would
receive adequate representation. 17 From the start, lawyers, judges, and re-
formers debated the proper role of this novel courtroom figure. The earliest
public defender proposals, originated by California's pioneering woman
lawyer Clara Shortridge Foltz, contemplated a skillful trial attorney who
would provide the indigent accused with the same zealous representation
that wealthy defendants could buy.'8 But many Progressive reformers en-
visioned the public defender as a partner to the public prosecutor, rather
than an adversary. The Progressive public defender would collaborate with
the district attorney to develop the facts of each case and propose a fair
resolution, taking into account not just the defendant's interests but also
the needs and safety of the community.19
As the Avilez case demonstrates, as late as 1948 this debate over the
public defender's function and ethical duties was still ongoing. The case
can thus be read as an encapsulation of these competing views of the public
defender's proper role: Is he a state official akin to the public prosecutor,
whose overriding duty is to the public? If so, when a defendant admits
his guilt, then the public defender should not waste valuable court time
contesting the charges. For San Francisco public defender Gerald Kenny,
16 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 296.
17 The Los Angeles County Public Defender's website describes its history since
1913. Los Angeles County Public Defender, History of the office, http://pd.co.1a.ca.us/
History.html (last visited Aug. 31,2009). See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing
the Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1270-77 (2006) [hereinafter Inventing]
(describing the origins of the public defender idea and the rationales offered by its sup-
porters).
18 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1275.
19 See id. at 1275-77 (contrasting Foltz's model with the Progressive model).
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it would have been an "obstruct[ion of] justice"2 0 not to allow the Black-
Gloved Rapist to plead guilty right away. This approach apparently satis-
fied the judge who sentenced Avilez, who assured the defendant that the
public defender "would not have proceeded" with the plea if there had
been any available alternative, because in his experience lawyers from the
public defender's office "[didn't] overlook anything when they appear[ed]
in court." He even praised public defenders for avoiding "the tricks and
methods used by some criminal attorneys" and instead representing their
clients "properly" and "honestly."21
But in the competing view, the public defender is no different from a
private defense attorney (apart from who signs his paychecks): His overrid-
ing duty is to provide each individual client with zealous advocacy. If so, it
would be a violation of that duty to allow a defendant to plead guilty at an
initial appearance. The appellate judge who decided Avilez sided with this
latter view, holding that
[t]he public defender stands in the same relation to the accused
he is appointed to represent as an attorney regularly retained. It
is his task to investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of law
which may be available to the defendant and to confer with him
about them before he permits his client to foreclose all possibility
of defense and submit to conviction without a hearing by plead-
ing guilty.... By giving his client such aid the attorney does not
obstruct, but assists justice.22
This essay traces these two competing visions of the public defender in
California from 1913 to 1948, and examines how and why the second view
ultimately prevailed, at least doctrinally. On the ground, some public de-
fenders may have continued to see themselves primarily as public servants,
and some trial judges may have endorsed this view. But in the 1940s, Cali-
fornia appellate judges rejected the Progressive ideal of the public defender.
They constructed the public defender as an opponent of the state, leaving
intact (at least in theory) the American adversary system of criminal justice.
20 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 296.
21 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting transcript of judge's
remarks).
22 Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d at 296.
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In so doing, they followed the direction of the United States Supreme Court,
which had recently issued a robust defense of adversary process in the land-
mark right-to-counsel case of Powell v. Alabama.23
That California courts defined the public defender in this way, es-
chewing the Progressive vision of cooperative justice, was a landmark
development in the history of California criminal law and procedure.
Through decisions like Avilez, appellate judges provided definition and
guidance for a still-developing institution that has since become a cor-
nerstone of California criminal practice. Today, half of California coun-
ties operate full-time public defender's offices, including the ten most
populous counties - Los Angeles, San Diego, Orange, Riverside, San
Bernardino, Santa Clara, Alameda, Sacramento, Contra Costa, and Fres-
no - which are home to almost 75% of the state's population.24 In some
California jurisdictions, the public defender's office represents almost ev-
eryone charged with a crime. 25
Yet historians have largely neglected the "little known" story of how
and why public defenders came to occupy such a central place in Cali-
fornia's criminal courtrooms. 26 The standard histories of Progressivism,
23 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See infra Part II.
24 Counties that do not run a full-time public defender contract out to private
attorneys to provide indigent defense. Of California's 15 most populous counties, only
San Mateo County employs a contract public defender. California Public Defenders
Association, "California Federal, State, and Local Public Defender Office Directory,"
April 1, 2010, available at http://www.cpda.org (last visited June 29, 2010); State of
California, Department of Finance, "Press Release: California Population Continues
Slowed Growth, According to New State Demographic Report," Dec. 17, 2009, available
at http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-2/2000-09/ (last
visited June 29, 2010).
25 For instance, about 90% of defendants in the City and County of San Fran-
cisco qualify for the services of a public defender, as documented in "Presumed Guilty,"
a documentary on the office by KQED (San Francisco's PBS affiliate). See PBS, Pre-
sumed Guilty, http://www.pbs.org/kqed/presumedguilty/4.0.0.html (last visited Aug.
31, 2009).
26 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1269. Standard histories of the American legal pro-
fession do not discuss the development of the public defender, and histories of crime
and punishment mention it only briefly, if at all. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME
& PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 394 ("A twentieth-century innovation was the
public defender."). A history that does discuss the early public defender movement in
more detail is GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH 195-99 (2003).
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even those that focus on California, do not mention the public defend-
er movement. 2 7 Yet the public defender idea was "widely advocated"
throughout the country in the 1910s and 1920s, attracted a great deal
of scholarly attention, and was viewed by many jurists as crucial to the
broader project of modernizing the legal system.28 Fortunately, the his-
tory of California's public defenders has not gone entirely untold. In
the course of her biographical work on Clara Shortridge Foltz, Barbara
Babcock has excavated the forgotten origins of the public defender move-
ment in Foltz's writings, speeches, and model legislation; framed the
competing visions of the public defender among Progressive-era reform-
ers; and outlined the constitutional and legal arguments that Foltz mar-
shaled to bolster her proposal. 2 9
Drawing on California court records, this essay builds on Babcock's
work by following the story of the public defender further into the twentieth
century, and by focusing more on how the idea was translated into practice
and doctrine. How did California lawyers and judges conceive of this new
player in the criminal justice system? How did they define the public de-
fender's professional and ethical commitments? In Part I, I contrast Foltz's
original vision of the public defender with the Progressive conception, which
was embraced by the nation's first public defender, Walton J. Wood of Los
Angeles. In part II, I analyze a key case in which the California Supreme
Court embraced the adversary model, and suggest some broader constitu-
tional and cultural developments that may explain this result.
27 Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender 8 n. 35 (Stanford Pub-
lic Law Working Paper No. 899993, 2006), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/
publications/details/3244/Inventing%20The%2OPublic%2ODefender [hereinafter In-
venting Working Paper].
28 ELIZABETH KEMPER ADAMS, WOMEN PROFESSIONAL WORKERS 74 (1921). For
a bibliography of some 110 scholarly articles on the public defender between 1914 and
1924, see A. Mabel Barrow, Public Defender: A Bibliography, 14 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
556 (1924). On Progressive efforts to modernize the criminal justice system, see gener-
ally Jonathan Simon, Visions of Self-Control: Fashioning a Liberal Approach to Crime
and Punishment in the Twentieth Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY (Aus-
tin Sarat et al., eds., 2002).
29 See generally Inventing, supra note 17. Prof. Babcock has shared with the au-
thor that she is also planning to include some information on the early public defender
movement in her forthcoming biography of Foltz.
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PART I: COMPETING VISIONS
OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
The public defender was the invention of Clara Shortridge Foltz, Califor-
nia's first woman lawyer.30 Based on her 15 years of trial practice, Foltz
observed that although courts usually appointed counsel for "pauper"
defendants who requested it, the caliber of those lawyers was low. Typi-
cally "they [had] no money to spend in an investigation of the case, and
[came] to trial wholly unequipped either in ability, skill or preparation to
cope with the man hired by the State."31 To level the field, Foltz envisioned
replacing appointed counsel with salaried county officials, provided with
public funds to maintain their offices - just as counties funded their dis-
trict attorney's offices. 32 Although Foltz lobbied for the public defender
nationwide, 33 her campaign's earliest successes came at home. In 1913 Los
Angeles County established the nation's first public defender office, and
in 1921, California became the first state to pass her model legislation, the
Foltz Defender Bill.34,35
The public defender idea found sympathetic ears among elite jurists,
who were horrified by the tawdry pageant of criminal law in general and
by criminal defense attorneys in particular. Criminal defense had once
been considered every lawyer's "sacred duty,"36 and as late as 1900 it was
30 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1271. Babcock has written several articles on Foltz's
biography and pioneering achievements. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge
Foltz: "First Woman," 30 ARIz. L. REV. 673 (1988), reprinted with a new introduc-
tion in 28 VAL. U.L. REV. 1231 (1994); Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz:
Constitution-Maker, 66 IND. L.J. 849 (1991); Barbara Allen Babcock, Reconstructing the
Person: The Case of Clara Shortridge Foltz, in REVEALING LIVES 131 (Susan Groag Bell
& Marilyn Yalom, eds., 1990).
31 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1271 (quoting Clara Foltz, Public Defenders - Rights
of Persons Accused of Crime - Abuses now Existing, 48 ALB. L.J. 248 (1893)).
32 For the text of the bill, see id. at 1272 n.30.
33 Id. at 1273.
34 Id. For a bibliography of some 110 scholarly articles on the public defender be-
tween 1914-1924, see Barrow, supra note 28.
35 CAL. STAT. 245 § 5 (1921). The bill allowed for counties to establish and fund
public defender's offices, but did not require it.
36 See Alan Rogers, "A Sacred Duty": Court Appointed Attorneys in Massachu-
setts Capital Cases, 1780-1980, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 440, 440-41 (1997). For repre-
sentative nineteenth-century views of criminal defense as a duty lawyers owed in their
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not uncommon for prominent lawyers to be generalists. But by the 1920s
the bar had specialized and stratified, with criminal defenders joining the
tort plaintiff's bar at the lowest stratum. 37 Surveys found that only a tiny
minority of lawyers accepted criminal cases; most viewed the work as dis-
reputable. 38 No longer a "sacred duty," neither did criminal practice offer
much promise of earthly rewards, "since it is impossible to build up a cli-
entele except among professional criminals." 39
In the Prohibition years, with tableaux of "g-men" and "gangsters"
dominating newsreels and headlines, elite jurists lamented the rise of a
cadre of "habitual defenders" who gleefully exploited loopholes and tech-
nicalities to keep their well-paying patrons out of prison.40 Procedural
capacity as officers of the court (which persisted into the 20th century at least in a few
influential works), see THOMAS COOLEY, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 697 (8th ed.
1927). However, by 1929 the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics
had recast criminal defense from a "duty" to a "right" of the bar. Compare CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHICS (1908) ("I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice.")
with CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1929) ("A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent
prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert
his best efforts in his behalf.").
37 Roscoe Pound observed, "The great achievements of the Bar were in the Forum
and the most conspicuous success was before juries in the trial of criminal cases.... In
the second stage leadership passed to the railroad lawyer.... Criminal law became the
almost exclusive field of the lower stratum of the Bar." Sienna Delahunt, Chapter IV
The Gentleman at the Bar, in RAYMOND MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS 62 (1930). For
historical analysis of the specialization and stratification of the bar, see, e.g., Robert W.
Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 287-336 (Austin
Sarat et al., eds., 2002).
38 The influential Cleveland Survey of Criminal Justice Survey found that of 386
Cleveland lawyers, almost 40% accepted no criminal cases at all, and only 3% took
them regularly. Delahunt, supra note 37, at 62. President Hoover's Wickersham Com-
mission reported on polls showing that lawyers considered criminal work "unremu-
nerative," disreputable because "it involves association with an undesirable element in
the profession," and overly technical. U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, 4 U.S. WICKERSHAM COMM'N REPORTS 27 (1931) [hereinafter WICKER-
SHAM COMM'N].
39 Delahunt, supra note 37, at 63.
40 E.g. WICKERSHAM COMM'N, supra note 38, at 19 ("Habitual defenders of crimi-
nals have learned to take advantage of [the prosecutor's nol pros power]."). On the cul-
tural image of the "gangster" in the Prohibition years, see generally DALE E. RUTH, IN-
VENTING THE PUBLIC ENEMY: THE GANGSTER IN AMERICAN CULTURE, 1918-1935 (1996)
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safeguards designed to protect the innocent in rural pioneer communi-
ties had become, in chaotic urban courtrooms, "pieces to be played" by
the guilty.41 At the other end of the spectrum were a different but equally
worrisome set of "habitual defenders," who, rather than helping wealthy
clients exploit the system, busied themselves with exploitation of a more
direct sort. For Progressive reformers concerned with the plight of the
poor, the problem was not that there were not enough lawyers. Rather, the
courthouses were overrun with lawyers - of the wrong kind. Whether
labeled "'shysters, .. . snitch lawyers,' 'jail lawyers,' 'vampires,' 'legal ver-
min,' 'harpies,' "42 "'Tombs runners,' "43 or "parasites,"44 these "unofficial
public defenders" 45 were all too eager to volunteer their services to a hap-
less defendant, only to extort the defendant's family for any payment they
could muster and, if none was forthcoming, provide a perfunctory defense
at best.
It is hard to know how many lawyers deserved the epithets. 46 As with
criticisms of the plaintiff's bar, criticisms of the criminal defense bar were
tinged with ethnic and class biases.47 However, there is probably a great
deal of truth to the seamy picture that emerges from the pages of these re-
ports on the urban criminal courts. Clara Foltz would not have disagreed
with elite complaints about jailhouse lawyers: it was precisely her experi-
ence with such characters that had inspired her public defender propos-
al. Relegated to criminal courtrooms because, as a woman, she had few
(analyzing constructions of the "gangster" in mass culture); BRYAN BURROUGH, PUBLIC
ENEMIES: AMERICAS GREATEST CRIME WAVE AND THE BIRTH OF THE FBI, 1933-34
(2004) (tracking the lives and crimes of some of the era's most notorious real-life fugi-
tive criminals and the FBI's much-publicized attempts to track them down).
41 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, supra note 38, at 21.
42 MAYER GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: A NECESSARY FACTOR IN THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 19-20 (1917).
43 CARNEGIE FOUNDATION, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 113 (1919).
44 Delahunt, supra note 37, at 66. Delahunt was an editor of the Columbia Law
Review.
45 Id. at 64.
46 See Gordon, supra note 37.
47 Id. at 295; see also id. at 297 (describing how bar association disciplinary mecha-
nisms were used not for self-regulation of the bar generally but primarily to discipline
immigrant personal injury lawyers).
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professional choices, Foltz observed her counterparts with dismay, noting
their "soiled linen" and "whiskey breath."4 8
But while Foltz proposed to solve the problem by using the public purse
to attract higher-caliber lawyers to criminal defense, some Progressive
reformers reimagined the public defender as a replacement for criminal
lawyers altogether.4 9 Their goal was not to provide poor defendants with
the equivalent of the gladiator that the rich could afford, but to remake
the system entirely so that gladiator-style defense was no longer welcome,
or rewarded. The Progressive public defender promised to transform each
criminal prosecution into "a cooperative search for corrective and pre-
ventive care" rather "than a contest of skill,"50 with "officers on the state"
on both sides, sharing "a singleness of purpose."51 Although the public
defender could and should zealously defend an innocent client, his only
duty to the guilty was to "see that [he was] fairly punished - not over-
punished."52
In 1913 Los Angeles County was the first jurisdiction to implement
Clara Foltz's public defender proposal. But though Foltz took credit for
the Los Angeles office, the office quickly departed from her vision. 53 The
first public defender in Los Angeles and thus the nation, Walton J. Wood,
adopted the Progressive model. In 1918 he wrote with pride that his young
office had "worked harmoniously" with the prosecutor's office: "We have
not felt that it was our duty to oppose the district attorney, but rather to co-
operate with him in setting all the facts before the courts." 54 The district
48 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1282 (quoting Foltz).
49 Id. at 1275.
50 Delahunt, supra note 37, at 62. In some of the more extreme proposals, private
practice would be eliminated altogether and every defendant would be required to sub-
mit to the representation of a public official - ensuring that high-paid lawyers on the
payroll of organized crime could no longer run circles around DAs, even as the public
defender would also solve the different problem of indigent defense. See, e.g., Maurice
Parmelee, Public Defense in Criminal Trials, 1 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735-47 (July
1911).
51 Delahunt, supra note 37, at 71.
52 GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 8.
53 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1275.
54 Barrow, supra note 28, at 569 (quoting W. J. Wood, Annual Report of the Pub-
lic Defender of Los Angeles County, California, 9 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289-96
(1918)). Barbara Babcock provides two examples of cases in which the Los Angeles
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attorney returned the sentiment, having written to Wood as early as 1914
that they shared a common goal: "You are performing a duty which this of-
fice has attempted to perform in safeguarding the rights of the defendant,
but I believe under the circumstances your position gives you a better op-
portunity to perform that duty than the prosecutor has."55 On the basis
of these early reports, Progressive reformers around the country praised
Wood's office as a model of their vision of public defense. 56
By the time that the 1921 statewide public defender law passed, the pio-
neering Los Angeles public defender's office had achieved a high degree of
respectability, overcoming any disrepute that the public and legal profession
reserved for criminal lawyers generally. The office enjoyed weeks of favorable
press when it handled the 1921 trial of Louise Peete, accused of defraud-
ing and murdering the wealthy oil magnate James Denton. Peete was con-
victed, but spared the death sentence17 - as a Progressive might have put
it, "punished - not over-punished."58 The trial "attracted headlines around
the world and was the sensation of Los Angeles while it lasted," with some
147,000 onlookers attempting to crowd into the courtroom. 59 The case re-
ceived favorable coverage throughout the state, with the public defender's
public defender's approach differed from that of a traditional defense attorney. In one
case, the defender facilitated a guilty plea in exchange for a lenient sentence "by show-
ing that his client was starving and seeking work when he stole." In contrast, Babcock
suggests, "Clara Foltz's defender ... might well take these appealing facts to a jury."
Inventing, supra note 17, at 1277.
55 GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 38-39.
56 A 1924 bibliography of articles on the public defender lists several that favor-
ably assess the Los Angeles office. See Barrow, supra note 28. Mayer Goldman, a New
York attorney who became a leading crusader for the Progressive public defender, cited
its successes approvingly in his 1917 book on public defense, quoting the 1914 letter.
GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 38-39.
57 Later Peete worked for many years as a housekeeper, and one by one her em-
ployers met with suspicious ends, but apart from her conviction in the Denton case, the
apparent serial killer managed to convince the authorities that all of the deaths were
accidents until she was finally convicted and sentenced to death in a 1945 prosecution
for the murder of Margaret Logan. See Louise, TIME, June 11, 1945 (summarizing Peete's
biography upon the occasion of her death sentence).
58 GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 8.
59 Former S.J. Man Now L.A. Public Defender, SAN JOSE MERCURY HERALD, March
23, 1921, at C13.
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participation meriting prominent mention.60 When the deputy P.D. who
conducted Peete's defense was promoted to the head of the office - replac-
ing Walton Wood, who had recently been named to a judgeship - his home-
town paper, the San Jose Mercury Herald, reported with pride on this "signal
honor."61 The extent to which the Los Angeles model had convinced Califor-
nia reformers of the merits of the public defender idea is also indicated by the
1920 recommendations of a San Francisco civil grand jury.62 After sketching
an image of the San Francisco justice system that would have been familiar
to many Progressive reformers - "the absence of decorum, delinquences of
judges, the prevalence of 'shysters"' - the grand jury recommended sweep-
ing reforms, including the establishment of a public defender's office.63
PART II: JUDICIAL VISIONS OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER - IN RE HOUGH
Throughout the 1920s, legal scholars debated whether the new public de-
fenders should aspire to be "individual advocate[s]" or "Progressive public
servant[s]." 64 As public defenders became fixtures in many counties, this
debate moved from the pages of legal journals into courtrooms throughout
California. In the 1940s, appellate judges stepped into the fray to provide
an authoritative construction of the public defender's role. In California
Supreme Court cases such as In re Hough and intermediate appellate cases
60 See, e.g., Slaying Case Is Opened, SAN JOSE MERCURY HERALD, Jan. 20, 1921, at
C20. The headlines read: "DENTON SLAYING CASE IS OPENED - Eleven Prospec-
tive Jurymen Are Selected in Los Angeles Court - Public Defender Acts as Attorney for
Mrs. Louise M. Peete During Trial."
61 Former S.J. Man Now L.A. Public Defender, SAN JOSE MERCURY HERALD, March
23, 1921, at C13.
62 California counties convene civil grand juries each year to scrutinize county
government and propose reforms. See Calif. Pen. Code § 905; Calif. Const. art. I, § 23
(requiring counties to empanel a grand jury to serve during each fiscal year). California
counties do also convene criminal grand juries for some cases, but the state does not
require that every prosecution proceed by grand jury indictment. See Jon M. Van Dyke,
Trial Juries and Grand Juries, in 2 ENCYC. OF THE AM. JUDICIAL SYSTEM 738-39 (1987).
63 Drive Shysters from S.F. Courts, Is Demand of Jury, SAN JOSE MERCURY HER-
ALD, July 21, 1920, at 8. The grand jury also proposed that the city increase judges' com-
pensation, eliminate private practice by judges, and extend judicial terms to six years,
among other reforms. Id.
64 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1277.
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like Avilez, the courts vindicated Foltz's model of the crusading trial law-
yer - rejecting any suggestion that public defenders might have a different
role than private defense attorneys.
Although California was unique in its early adoption of the public de-
fender system, it took a confluence of legal-historical developments that
were not unique to California to open the space for appellate judges to
opine on the question. Beginning in the 1920s and '30s, state court judg-
es across the country became increasingly willing to entertain prisoners'
claims that their convictions should be overturned because they had suf-
fered from ineffective or negligent defense at trial.65 In some cases, judges
familiar with the same courthouse conditions that so horrified Progressive
reformers were sympathetic to young, uneducated, non-English-speaking
prisoners who had been scammed by so-called jailhouse lawyers. 66 In such
cases, it was difficult to maintain the legal fiction, carried over from the
civil context, that attorney negligence must be imputed to the client, be-
cause the attorney was no more than the client's agent (i.e., the client had
assumed the risk). The Supreme Court provided a constitutional imprima-
tur to this nascent line of cases with Powell v. Alabama in 1932, overturn-
ing the rape convictions of nine black teenagers who had effectively gone
without counsel: a lawyer was appointed the morning of trial, leaving no
time to investigate or prepare a defense.67 Finally, the expansion of state
and federal habeas corpus review beginning in the 1940s made it easier
for prisoners to bring collateral appeals introducing new evidence. This
last development was particularly important since it is often impossible to
prove an attorney's negligence from the trial record alone.68
65 The early development of the "ineffective assistance of counsel" claim as a
grounds for criminal appeal is discussed briefly in James A. Strazzella, Ineffective As-
sistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 443,443-44,447
n.17 (1977). See also D.F.M., Note, Incompetency of Counsel as the Basis for a New Trial
in Criminal Cases, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379 (1923) (discussing early cases and observ-
ing that "[t]he not infrequent jeopardizing of a man's life in a criminal trial by the inef-
ficiency or negligence of his attorney has given rise to a new doctrine which, in several
jurisdictions, has permitted a letting down of the bars of strict legal procedure").
66 E.g. People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73 (Ill. 1924); Sanchez v. State, 199 Ind. 235 (1927).
67 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
68 See Strazzella, supra note 65, at 444. IAC litigation exploded in the 1960s after
a series of landmark Supreme Court cases expanded avenues for collateral attack of
criminal convictions.
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To be sure, successful cases of this type remained relatively rare un-
til the 1960s and the complex jurisprudence of "ineffective assistance of
counsel" that has developed since the 1984 case Strickland v. Washington,
after which IAC claims became the most common type of criminal appeal,
did not yet exist. 69 Well into the twentieth century, most state courts took
for granted that it was "beyond the power of the court to set aside a verdict
because of the inefficiency of counsel."70 But whether or not his appeal was
successful, every time a convicted prisoner pressed an attorney negligence
claim he provided appellate judges with an occasion to opine on the proper
role and duties of the defense attorney. It was through one such case, in
1944, that the California Supreme Court clarified the question of the pub-
lic defender's duties to his client.
The case of William Leva Hough got to the California Supreme Court
on a writ of habeas corpus. Hough was on death row at San Quentin for
the 1942 murders at a Long Beach caf6 of his estranged wife and a gentle-
man friend of hers.71 Hough argued that his guilty pleas were void because
he had been misled by the trial judge, prosecutor, and public defender to
believe that if he pled guilty, he would be sentenced to life imprisonment.72
The court rejected Hough's claims that the judge and prosecutor had mis-
led him out of hand, finding no showing in the record of any promises to
Hough.73 Hough's claims against his counsel - Erling Hovden, a 12-year
veteran of the Los Angeles County public defender's office - were no more
69 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
70 Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 26 (1923).
71 In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 524 (Cal. 1944); Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus
at 11, In re Hough, Crim. 4500 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944). At the time of the murders, the
Houghs had initiated divorce proceedings and each had taken out a restraining order
against the other. Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11. All court documents cited
in this essay relating to In re Hough are available at the California State Archives by
requesting the file for California criminal case number Crim. 4500.
72 Hough, 24 Cal.2d at 525, 527-28, 533. Hough, who suffered from syphilis and
various neuroses, also argued on appeal that he was mentally incompetent at the time of
the plea. The California Supreme Court quickly dispatched with this claim, observing
that of the three alienists appointed by the trial court, two had evaluated him as sane at
both the time of the murders and the time of their examination, and the third had been
inconclusive. As such, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he allowed the
prosecution could proceed. Id. at 533-34.
73 Id. at 527.
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successful, but in the course of rejecting them, the court took the opportu-
nity to elaborate upon the public defender's role.
Hough's first contention (as construed by the court) was that "the pub-
lic defender [was] an officer of the county, and represent[ed] the state in
the prosecution of criminal actions, in the same light and to the same ex-
tent as the district attorney. . . ."74 Echoing the Progressive reformers who
imagined the public defender as a partner of the prosecutor, this position
did have a certain logic: the public defender was on the county payroll.75
But the California Supreme Court rejected it out of hand: "Petitioner cites
no authority in support of his contention and none has come to our at-
tention." Rather, under the Court's interpretation of the California public
defender statute,
when the public defender is appointed to represent a defendant ac-
cused of a crime, he becomes the attorney for said defendant for all
purposes of the case and to the same extent as if regularly retained
and employed by the defendant. The judge of the trial court has no
more authority or control of him than he has of any other attorney
practicing before his court.76
Thus the public defender was an agent of the client, not the county.77
But the court had overstated Hough's argument. Hough's appellate
lawyer was Morris Lavine of Los Angeles, who apparently took the case
pro bono at the urging of friends of Hough's.78 Nowhere in his briefs or
oral argument did Lavine argue, as the court claimed, that "the public de-
fender ... represents the state in the prosecution of criminal actions, in the
74 Id. at 528.
75 Compare recent cases that have tried (mostly unsuccessfully) to frame the pub-
lic defender as a state actor for the purposes of constitutional analysis. Vermont v. Bril-
lon, 556 U.S. ___ (decided March 9, 2009) (no speedy trial violation if delay was public
defender's fault); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defenders are not
state actors for Section 1983 litigation). Many studies have found that clients perceive
public defenders as part of the criminal justice bureaucracy, rather than individual ad-
vocate. See William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Law and Crimi-
nal Procedure, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 33 n.117 (1997).
76 Hough, 24 Cal.2d at 528-29.
77 Id. at 529.
78 Affidavit of Morris Lavine (January 17, 1944) at 2-3, In re Hough, Crim. 4500
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944).
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same light and to the same extent as the district attorney . . 79 Rather,
Lavine's brief acknowledged that the public defender "acted on behalf of
the defendant"; but it also made the common-sense observation that, as a
public official, the public defender "was an officer of the state and county,
just as much as the district attorney."8 0 Thus far Lavine had not written
anything controversial or even controvertible. His novel legal argument
came at the next step, when he argued that "any representations made by
the court to Mr. Hovden," and then conveyed by Hovden to Hough, were,
by some transitive property of criminal law, direct representations from
the state to the defendant. As such, Hough had a right to rely on them. For
this proposition Lavine did indeed cite authority: a line of cases holding
that public officials' promises are binding.81 It is telling that the court did
not distinguish these cases, instead implying that it was self-evident that
public defenders were not public officials in a legal sense, even if they re-
ceived a public salary.
But while a reasonable construction of the public defender statute, the
court's reading is not self-evident. The statute simply provided that the
public defender "shall defend, without expense to them, all persons who
are not financially able to employ counsel and who are charged with the
commission of any contempt, misdemeanor, felony or other offense."82 The
precise content of the verb "shall defend" was not specified. Nor did any
provision in the statute clarify whether the fact that public defenders were
salaried by the county transformed them into public officials for other le-
gal purposes. Nonetheless, after Hough the authoritative judicial construc-
tion of the statute was clear: "shall defend" meant "shall defend just as
retained counsel would do." The Hough court also elevated this statutory
equivalence to a constitutional requirement:
The public defender is free from any restraint or domination by
the district attorney or of the prosecuting authorities. He is as free
to act in behalf of his client as if he had been regularly employed
and retained by the defendant whom he represents. Were it not so
79 Hough, 24 Cal.2d at 528.
80 Petitioner's Brief at 10, In re Hough, Crim. 4500 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944).
81 Id. at 11-12 (citing cases).
82 Hough, 24 Cal.2d at 528 (quoting the statute as on the books at the time of
Hough).
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his client would not be afforded the full right 'to have assistance
of counsel for his defense' which the Constitutions, both state and
federal, give to one accused of crime.83
Hough made a second argument that, even if Hovden's advice to plead
guilty was attributed only to himself and not the county, it was still uncon-
stitutionally coercive. In an affidavit, Hough testified that Hovden had told
him, "I guarantee you that if you plead guilty you won't get gassed."84 The
Hough court did not reach the question of whether such a promise could
ever be the basis for overturning a plea. Instead, the court rejected the fac-
tual predicate for the argument, finding it implausible that Hovden would
have actually given such misleading advice. Not only did Hovden himself
deny making any such assurances, the Court emphasized that he was an
experienced public defender and that even Hough's appellate counsel ad-
mitted of his reputation as a "courageous" and "high class attorney."85
To reach this result, the court engaged in some remarkably creative
misreading of Hough's briefing. Lavine had indeed praised Hovden as
"courageous" at oral argument, but he was not referring to Hovden's gen-
eral reputation. Rather, he was praising Hovden (and his supervisor at the
P.D.'s office) for supporting Hough in his habeas petition. Hovden had
sworn a lengthy affidavit with his account of the plea negotiations, even
though given "the circumstances" (presumably, the risk that he would face
opprobrium for his conduct of Hough's defense), other public defenders
would have likely been "inclined to forget it and let the defendant defend
himself."86 Hovden did deny making the verbatim statement, "I guarantee
you that if you plead guilty you won't get gassed," or any other "guarantee"
of a particular punishment.87 But he did so only in response to a letter
from the clerk of the California Supreme Court, requesting that he clarify
whether or not he had made that precise statement.88 In this supplemental
83 Id. at 529.
84 Id. at 529.
85 Id. at 530.
86 Oral Argument of Morris Lavine, Esq., on Behalf of Appellant (May 8, 1944), In
re Hough, Crim. 4500 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944).
87 Supplemental Affidavit of Erling J. Hovden (April 21, 1944), In re Hough, Crim.
4500 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1948).
88 Clerk of Supreme Court to Attorney General Robert W. Kenny and Morris
Lavine, April 13, 1944, California State Archives, Crim. No. 4500.
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affidavit filed at the court's request, Hovden remained quite clear that al-
though he had made no guarantees, he had informed Hough that "in view
of the repeated statements made to [him] by the trial court, [he] could not
conceive of the imposition of the extreme penalty on a plea of guilty."89
At oral argument, Lavine suggested that the issue was not Hoyden's exact
words but whether "it was a reasonable inference for Hough to conclude
that the promise of a life sentence had been made."90
In Hovden's original affidavit, he was even more explicit. He described
multiple conversations with both the young deputy district attorney assigned
to the case and a senior deputy district attorney with whom he had a close
working relationship, as well as the trial judge, Leslie Still. Although the D.A.'s
office insisted upon officially recommending a sentence of death, Hovden tes-
tified that Judge Still had repeatedly indicated that he would not impose such
a sentence if the defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder,
and at least one deputy D.A. agreed that a life sentence would be appropriate.
True, the day before trial Judge Still had cautioned Hovden that he might have
to impose death after all, but Hovden interpreted that proviso merely
as a statement by the court to defense counsel which would pro-
tect both the court and counsel from any criticism that a definite
promise had been made as to the disposition of the case.... For
many reasons trial judges are unwilling to make positive commit-
ments but counsel is guided by and relies upon their expressed
general impressions and act with complete confidence on tacit un-
derstandings as to the disposition of their cases. So in this instant
case the court had on every occasion when he had expressed him-
self as to what he believed to be a proper punishment in the light
of the facts of the case, he had agreed... that life imprisonment
would serve the ends of justice. Furthermore, the court well knew
that the sole and only reason for entering pleas of guilty would
be to eliminate even the possibility of the death penalty.... Up to
the very moment of the pronouncement of sentence there was no
intimation by the court that such a penalty would be imposed.91
89 Id.
90 Oral Argument, supra note 86, at 8-9.
91 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Supporting Affidavit of Erling J. Hov-
den (May 25, 1943) at 7-8, In re Hough, Crim. 4500 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944).
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Hovden concluded that he "was misled by the comments of the court,"
that he had advised his client on that basis, and that Hough's guilty pleas
"would not have been entered had counsel not been so misled by the trial
court's remarks."92
Perhaps the California Supreme Court simply chose not to credit Hov-
den's testimony over the competing affidavits filed by the state, in which
the prosecutors and Judge Still denied much of Hovden's account. But in-
stead of saying so, the court misdescribed Hovden's testimony, as if Hov-
den had testified against his former client, rather than acknowledging that
Hovden's affidavits, if credited, tended to support Hough's claims. In a cu-
rious way, the court's rewriting of Hovden's testimony reveals the high re-
gard in which California judges held public defenders. The court's opinion
portrays Hough as the typical disgruntled death row prisoner, turning his
back on those who tried to help him, including Hovden, a veteran pub-
lic defender and "high-class attorney" who would never have done what
Hough had accused him of doing. Against the murderer stood the rule of
law - judges and lawyers - and by ignoring Hovden's testimony on the
murderer's behalf, the California Supreme Court welcomed him into that
august circle. Perhaps the justices imagined themselves to be defending
Hovden's reputation against the slander of an ungrateful former client. But
Hough had never accused Hovden of intentionally harming him. In his
briefings Hough had argued that if Hovden had misled him, it was only
because he had been misled in turn.
In fact, William Hough described his public defender Erling Hovden
as his only friend in the days after his arrest. But to establish an identity
between public defenders and private defense attorneys, the California Su-
preme Court necessarily ignored Hough's descriptions of this relationship
- a relationship quite different from that of wealthy defendants to their
lawyers. A welder in the Long Beach shipyards, Hough could hardly afford
92 Id. at 15-16. Compare the court's reasoning: The court acknowledged that Hov-
den had "filed a lengthy affidavit" and been "a most willing witness" in Hough's behalf,
but concluded that as "Mr. Hovden emphatically denies making any such assertion as
that attributed to him by petitioner, we are unable to give credence to petitioner's claim
that he was misled in entering his pleas of guilty by any assurance or guarantee on the
part of Mr. Hovden." In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522 (1944).
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to retain counsel to defend a double murder trial. What else could he do
besides rely on the assurances made to him by his public defender?
You see I was a verry sick man all this time and I was trying to get
money to Hire a Lawyer and it did look like I did not have a friend
in the world and then Mr Houden come to me and told me. I have
talked to Judge Still and he has led me to bee able to tell you if you
will Change your Plee to Guilty and withdraw the Insanity Plee I
can guarantiee that he wont give you the Extreame Pinalty ... .93
Of course Hough had relied on Hovden's advice, he said: "I had no one else
to rely on."94
PART IV: CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's explication of the public defender's
role did nothing to help William Hough; in the end, Hough was spared ex-
ecution, but by executive rather than judicial clemency.95 In fact, perhaps it
was the justices' inclination to uphold Hough's conviction that motivated
them to construe the public defender statute the way they did in Hough.
But the precedent had been set, and in 1948 this precedent would work in
the favor of another California prisoner, Frank Avilez.
Avilez's experience with the San Francisco public defender in 1947
demonstrates that confusion persisted among lawyers and trial judges
about the public defender's role. Avilez's public defender apparently be-
lieved that his role was to facilitate quick guilty pleas, at least in egregious
cases. 96 As Melvin Belli described it in his appellate brief, the public de-
fender "spent some seconds with the defendant before a plea of guilty was
entered, which subjects the defendant to some four hundred fifty-three
93 Lavine Affidavit, supra note 78, at 3 (quoting letter from Hough).
94 Traverse to the Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus and Affidavit of William
Hough (July 5, 1943) at 6, In re Hough, Crim. 4500 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944).
95 In 1945 Hough's death sentence was commuted to a life sentence by acting Gov.
Frederick F. Houser. See AuSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL 223 (2005).
96 But see Love Killer Spurns Test, L. A. TIMES, June 21, 1936, at 3 (discussing a case
in which Gerald Kenny did provide a vigorous defense, even though his client wanted
to plead guilty).
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years in prison!"97 The Progressive reformers who imagined the public de-
fender as a partner to the public prosecutor, with no interest in wasting the
court's time defending an admittedly guilty client, may have seen nothing
wrong with this behavior.98
But California's appellate judges rejected this approach wholesale, as a
derogation of the defense attorney's duty. In overturning Avilez's convic-
tions, the First District Court of Appeal confirmed that it was Clara Foltz's
individual advocate, not the Progressive public servant, that a California
public defender should aspire to be. As the California Supreme Court had
held in Hough, "The public defender stands in the same relation to the
accused he is appointed to represent as an attorney regularly retained."99
To allow a client to plead before conducting any investigation of the facts
and the law beyond the client's bare assertion of guilt was to risk overlook-
ing meritorious defenses or mitigating evidence that the client might have,
even if the client, unschooled in the law, did not dispute what he perceived
to be the charges against him. For this proposition, the Avilez court quoted
at length from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama,
which had elevated to the status of constitutional law the defense attorney's
central role in the American system of adjudicating criminal guilt:
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of deter-
mining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.... He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
had a perfect one.100
97 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 5, 22. Belli claimed this sentence was
"the longest ever meted out in the history of the State." Id. at 22.
98 GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 66-67. Mayer Goldman's book The Public Defender
spelled out what a public defender should do when a client admitted guilt, and it was
precisely what the San Francisco public defender had done with Avilez: plead the client
guilty.
99 People v. Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d 289, 296 (1948) (citing Hough).
100 Powell v. Alabama, at 68-69. Powell is cited repeatedly in Avilez, 86 Cal.App.2d
at 296. It had also been quoted in Avilez's appellate brief. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra
note 2, at 30-31 (quoting Powell excerpt from People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal.App.2d 557).
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Barbara Babcock notes that Clara Foltz herself never addressed explic-
itly the difference between the two competing models of public defense,
and suggests that perhaps they differed only in emphasis.101 Even so, in
cases at the margin, such as Avilez, which model the court adopted could
mean the difference between upholding and reversing a conviction. And
in the public defender's day-to-day work, any number of small decisions
would come out differently depending on how the defender viewed him-
self: as a zealous advocate for each individual client, or a public servant
helping the justice system as a whole run smoothly. By 1948 California
courts had clearly established, doctrinally, the former view.
Although the appellate court used Avilez to make a point about public
defenders, the subsequent story of Frank Avilez makes a different point:
Sometimes there's only so much a defense attorney can do for a client -
regardless of who signs his paychecks. After winning the appeal, Melvin
Belli realized he "couldn't really put on a new trial, not one that would
end up with any different verdict."102 In addition to physical evidence and
Avilez's own confessions, the state had five eyewitnesses. So Belli pled him
guilty to ten counts, and 340 years. 103 Essentially it was still a life sentence.
Nevertheless, as Belli recalled years later, "Avilez was grateful and sent me
a telegram from San Quentin: THANK YOU FOR CUTTING MY SEN-
TENCE IN HALF."104
101 Inventing, supra note 17, at 1279. The narrow width of any gap between the
two ideals is also indicated by the fact that Walton Wood, though upheld as an ideal
Progressive public defender, did not dispute that in some cases a public defender should
not allow his client to plead guilty right away: "Often the defendant does not know
whether he has in fact committed a crime." Walton J. Wood, THE PLACE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 17 (1914).
102 MELVIN M. BELLI & ROBERT BLAIR KAISER, MELVIN BELLI 84 (1976).
103 Prison Terms 340 Years, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1948, at 4.
104 BELLI, supra note 101, at 84. Belli likely embellished this account of Avilez's
case for poetic effect, describing the sentence as having been halved from 440 to 220
years, but contemporary reports suggest it was only cut to 340 years. See supra text at
note 102.
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